Money, Credit & Banking
Memorandum
Original (Dec. 3, 1999)
By Dan Meador
This original memorandum was constructed
as part of a pleading to be filed in the near future. It treats credit,
money, banking, and the disability of state judgments relating to these
matters.
Contrary to prohibitions in Article I § 10 of
the Constitution of the United States, the defendants, as officers of
the court and otherwise, charge fees, impose fines, sanctions and other
penalties, make monetary awards, and accommodate federally chartered
and/or regulated financial institutions in mediums other than gold and
silver coin of the UnitedStates. They thereby defy the law of the land,
and in so doing, compromise sovereignty and solvency of the People of
Kay County and Oklahoma. Collectively, these acts constitute perjury,
as defined by Article XV §2 of the Constitution of the State of
Oklahoma, and otherwise constitutecriminal acts.
Article I § 8, clauses 5 & 6 of the U.S.
Constitution impose duties on Congress: "[The Congress shall have
Power] To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign
Coin.., [and] To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the
Securities and current Coin of the United States."
Article I § 10 ¶ 1 then establishes
prohibitions against theStates:
-
- Section 10. No State shall enter
into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation … coin Money; emit Billsof
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of
Debts…
There has been no amendment to the
Constitution of the United States altering or abolishing obligations of
Congressenumerated in Article I § 8, or prohibitions against States of
the Union in Article I § 10. It follows that Oklahoma public servants
cannot issue, and certainly cannot traffic in or enforce private bills
of credit, or otherwise burden or penalize the People of Oklahoma
through alternative credit and monetary schemes prohibited by Article I
§ 10 ofthe U.S. Constitution. Yet via what amounts to unconstitutional
legislation, the Oklahoma Legislature has consented to, or directly
entered agreements adopting credit-based monetary schemes.
In the Uniform Commercial Code, at 12A Okla.
Stat. 1-201(24), the definition of "money" that governs all current
financial transactions in Oklahoma is as follows:
-
- (24) "Money" means a medium of
exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government and
includes a monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental
organization or by agreement between two or more nations.
The second significant factor in this
obviously unconstitutional scheme is "credit", as defined in the
Oklahoma Consumer Credit Code at 14A Okla. Stat. § 1-301(7):
- (7) "Credit" means the right
granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur
debt and defer its payment.
The "credit" definition above duplicates the
definition of credit in the Federal Consumer Protection Act at 15
U.S.C. § 1602.
The definitions of "money" and "credit"
provide a context for the general fraud: The definition of "money" at
12AOkla. Stat. § 1-201(24) is contrary to and prohibited by Article I §
10 of the Constitution of the United States, and "credit";, as defined
at 14A Okla. Stat. § 1-301(7), is prohibited by Article I § 10 of the
U.S. Constitution as States of the Union cannot authorize or enforce
what they themselves are prohibited from doing. Congresshas no
constitutionally delegated authority to authorize private bills of
credit, or substitute currency other than that prescribed by the U.S.
Constitution. By virtue of explicit prohibitions at Article I § 10,
States of the Union cannot accommodate either the money alternatives or
the "credit" instrument which colorably endorses or extends consent and
authority to defer payment rather than pay debt.
On a different subject, the Supreme Court of
the United States addressed the effect of the separation of powers
doctrine, and the prohibition against States of the Union accommodating
exercise of federal powers not enumerated in the Constitution, in New
York v. United States, 505 U=2ES. 144, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d
120 (1992), at pp. 2431-2432:
- The answer follows from an
understanding of the fundamental purpose served by our Government's
federal structure. The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of
States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract
political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials
governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of
individuals. State sovereigntyis not just an end in itself: "Rather,
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
diffusion of sovereign power." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759,
115 L. Ed. 2d 640, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).
"Just as the separation and independence ofthe coordinate branches of
the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive
power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States
and the Federal Government will reduce the risk oftyranny and abuse
from either front." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 458. See The
Federalist No. 51, p. 323 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
-
- Where Congress exceeds its
authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the
constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the "consent" of state
officials. An analogy to the separation of powers among the branches of
the Federal Government clarifies this point. The Constitution's
division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch
invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon
branch approves the encroachment. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
118-137, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976), for instance, the
Court heldthat Congress had infringed the President's appointment
power, despite the fact that the President himself had manifested his
consent to the statute that caused the infringement by signing it into
law. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 842, n.12. In
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.919, 944-959, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317, 103 S. Ct. 2764
(1983), we held that thelegislative veto violated the constitutional
requirement that legislation be presented to the President, despite
Presidents' approval of hundredsof statutes containing a legislative
[**2432] veto provision. See id., at 944-945. The constitutional
authority of Congress cannot be expandedby the "consent" of the
governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit
is the Executive Branch or the States.
State officials thus cannot consent to the
enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the
Constitution. Indeed, the factsof these cases raise the possibility
that powerful incentives might leadboth federal and state officials to
view departures from the federal structure to be in their personal
interests. Most citizens recognize the need for radioactive waste
disposal sites, but few want sites near their homes. As a result, while
it would be well within the authority of either federal or state
officials to choose where the disposal sites will be, it is likely to
be in the political interest of each individual official to avoid being
held accountable to the voters for the choice of location. If a federal
official is faced with the alternatives of choosing a location or
directing the States to do it, the official may well prefer the latter,
as a means of shifting responsibility for the eventual decision. If a
state official is faced with the same set of alternatives -- choosing a
location or having Congress direct the choice of a location -- the
state official may also prefer the latter, as it may permit the
avoidance of personal responsibility. The interests of public officials
thus may not coincide with the Constitution's intergovernmental
allocation of authority. Where state officials purport to submit to the
direction of Congress in this manner, federalism is hardly being
advanced.
Nor does the State's prior support for the
Act estop it from assertingthe Act's unconstitutionality. While New
York has received the benefit of the Act in the form of a few more
years of access to disposal sites in other States, New York has never
joined a regional radioactive waste compact. Any estoppel implications
that might flow from membership in a compact, see West Virginia ex rel.
Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 35-36, 95 L. Ed.713, 71 S. Ct. 557 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring), thus do not concernus here. The fact that
the Act, like much federal legislation, embodies a compromise among the
States does not elevate the Act (or the antecedentdiscussions among
representatives of the States) to the status of an interstate agreement
requiring Congress' approval under the Compact Clause. Cf. Holmes v.
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 572, 10 L. Ed. 579 (1840) (plurality
opinion). That a party collaborated with others in seeking legislation
has never been understood to estop the party from challenging that
legislation in subsequent litigation.
Although state and federal courts ignore and
otherwise accommodate fiat credit and monetary systems, the
principles Justice O’Connor recited in New York v. United States
are just as applicable to mandates and prohibitions relating to gold
and silver coin and bills of credit in Article I §§ 8 & 10 as they
are to any other state or federal authority. The various "money" units
endorsed by 12AOkla. Stat. § 1-201(24), and "credit" endorsed at 14A
Okla. Stat. 1-301(7), are patently unconstitutional. Even if Oklahoma
is party to an intergovernmental agreement that endorses anything other
than gold and silver coin as a tender for payment of debt, the
agreement can be of no lawful effect, with or without congressional
endorsement. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the matter conclusively
in United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560, 13 L.Ed. 257, at 261:
- If the medium which the
government was authorized to create and establish could immediately be
expelled, and substituted by one it neither created, estimated, nor
authorized &emdash;; one of no intrinsic value &emdash; then
the power conferred by the Constitution would be useless, wholly
fruitless of every end it was designed toaccomplish. Whatever functions
the Congress are, by the Constitution authorized to perform, they are,
when the public good requires it, bound to perform; and on this
principle, having emitted a circulating medium, a standard of value,
indispensable for the purposes of the community, and forthe action of
the government itself, they are accordingly authorized andbound in duty
to prevent its debasement and expulsion, and the destruction of the
general confidence and convenience, by the influx and substitution of a
spurious coin in lieu of the constitutional currency.
Under Article I § 8 of the U.S. Constitution,
Congress has a duty to provide gold and silver coin as the national
currency; under of Article I § 10, the several States are prohibited
from minting coin, emitting bills of credit, or making anything but
gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt. Neither the U.S.
Constitution nor the Oklahoma Constitution vest Congress or the
Oklahoma Legislature with power to grant blanket authority to defer
payment of debt or endorse private bills of credit as a medium of
exchange. Therefore, the Uniform Commercial Code and the Consumer
Credit Code are patently unconstitutional, and all acts of state
officials which endorse, enforce, or otherwise accommodate credit and
money alternatives accommodated by the acts are void. An
unconstitutional act is void from its inception; it does notcreate
rights, benefits or obligations, and it does not afford immunity for
those who act under what amounts to color of law.
The question, of course, is how the current
state of affairs came to pass, and how accommodating mechanics were
implemented. Reviewing the emergency act enacted in special session of
Congress on March 9, 1933 is a good place to begin.
The legislation put forth that day was House
Resolution 1491, the final legislation published beginning at 48 Stat.
1. At the onset, the Act declares, "That the Congress hereby declares
that a serious emergency exists and that it is imperatively necessary
speedily to put into effect remedies of uniform national application."
Title I, Section 1 of the act affirms
emergency orders issued by President Roosevelt on or after March 4,
1933, "pursuant to the authorityconferred by subdivision (b) of section
5 of the Act of October 6, 1917, as amended, are hereby approved and
confirmed."
The act referred to is the Trading With the
Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, H.R. 4960, 40 Stat. 411. The purpose of
the act was, "To define,regulate, and punish trading with the enemy…"
The term "enemy" is defined in Section 2:
- Sec. 2. That the word "enemy,"
as used herein, shall be deemed to mean, for the purposes of
suchtrading and of this Act &emdash;
- Any individual, partnership,
or other body of individuals, of any nationality, resident within the
territory (including that occupied by the military and naval forces) of
any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside
the United States and doing business within such territory, and any
corporation incorporated within such territory of any nation with which
the United States is at war or incorporated within any contry other
than the United States and doing business within such territory.
-
- The government of any nation
with which the United States is at war, or any political or municipal
subdivision thereof, or any officer, official, agent, or agency thereof.
-
- Such other individuals, or
body or class of individuals, as may be natives, citizens, or subjects
of any nation with which the United States is at war, other than
citizens of the United States, wherever resident or wherever doing
business, as the President, if he shall find the safety ofthe United
States or the successful prosecution of the war shall so require, may,
by proclamation, include within the term "enemy."
The 1933 amendment was to Section 5(b) of the
Act, the original as follows (40 Stat. 415):
- (b) That the President may
investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as
he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions
in foreignexchange, export or ear-markings of gold or silver coin or
bullion or currency, transfers of credit in any form (other than
credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly within
the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of
the ownership of property between the United States and any foreign
country, whether enemy, ally of enemy or otherwise, or between
residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person within the
United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such
transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative
thereto, including the production of any books of account,contracts,
letters or other papers, in connection therewith in the custody or
control of such person, either before or after such transaction is
completed.
The 1933 amendment is in Section 2 of the act
of March 9, 1933:
- Sec. 2. Subdivision (b) of
section 5 of the Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. L. 411), as amended,
is hereby amended to read as follows:
-
- "(b) During time of war or
during any other period of national emergency declared by the
President, the President may, through any agency that he may designate,
or otherwise, investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and
regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenseor otherwise, any
transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit between or
payments by banking institutions as defined by the President, and
export, hoarding, melting, or ear-marking of gold or silver coin or
bullion or currency, by any person within the United States or any
place subject to the jurisdiction thereof; and the President may
require any person engaged in any transaction referred to in this
subdivision to furnishunder oath, complete information relative
thereto, including the production of any books of account, contracts,
letters or other papers, in connection therewith in the custody or
control of such person, either before or after such transaction is
completed…
While the act of March 9, 1933 amended 67;
5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, it did not amend the object of
the Act, the object being an enemy as defined in § 2 of the original
act, nor did it amend or repeal mandates and prohibitions of Article
I§§ 8 & 10 of the U.S. Constitution. As states in In Re: Powell,
602 P.2d 711 (1979), Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. vs. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398 (1933), and numerous other cases, no emergency justifies
override or suspension of the Constitution, so this amendment, which
appears to have universal application throughout the nation, was either
patently unconstitutional, as suggested in Senate Report No. 93-549, or
it has a more restrictive application than meets the eye.
The key phrase in the amended § 5(b) is, "…by
any person within the United States or any place subject to the
jurisdiction thereof…"
The amended § 5(b) did and does apply to the
"geographical"; United States, which includes the District of Columbia
and territories and insular possessions of the United States.
Application is clarified by the definitions
in Title II § 202 of the Act, Title II being the "Bank Conservation
Act."
- Sec. 202. As used in this
title, the term "bank" means (1) any national banking association, and
(2) any bank or trust company located in the District of Columbia and
operating under the supervision of the Comptroller of the Currency; and
the term "State" means any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States, and the Canal Zone.
Variations of the "State" definition are
found throughout the United States Code. States of the Union are not
States of the United States, as such; States of the United States
include the District of Columbia, and insular possessions of the United
States, today including Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Until 1946, the Philippines
was an insular possession of the United States, and until they were
admitted as States of the Union, Alaska and Hawaii were "States of the
United States." Names of territories and insular possessions following
"States of the United States" demonstrate the class of "Federal"; State
by example.
One of the better examples that distinguishes
between "States of the United States" and the Union of several States
is the venue and jurisdiction section of the criminal code, at 18
U.S.C. § 3231:
- § 3231. District courts
-
- The district courts of the
United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts
of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.
-
- Nothing in this title shall be
held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the
several States under the laws thereof.
It is necessary to go to Rule 54(c), Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to determine application of an "Act of
Congress", and the term "State":
- "Act of Congress" includes any
act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of
Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.
-
- "State" includes District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possession.
The first sentence of 18 U.S.C. § 3231 gives
district courts of the United States jurisdiction exclusive of
territorial courts; the second preserves laws and judicial authority of
theseveral States within their respective jurisdictions.
This maze shouldn’t be necessary if Congress
acted uniformly under Article I delegated powers. However, Congress,
and federal government as a whole, is schizophrenic: The United States
has restricted authority relative to States of the Union, but has
permissive authority over territory belonging to the United States. In
the first instance, Congress may exercise only powers enumerated by the
Constitution; in the second, Congress may exercise any power not
expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Where the several States are
concerned, Congress may not delegate universalpower to the President,
as the emergency bill of March 9, 1933 did (New York v. United States,
supra) where insular possessions ceded by Spain following the
Spanish-American War (1898) have been under military or quasi-military
authority from the onset. In territorial courts of Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands, judicial process has always proceeded in the name and
by authority of the, "United States of America, ss, President of the
United States." (See applicable sections in Title 48 ofthe United
States Code)
In practice, the amended § 5(b) of the
Trading With the Enemy Actand the Bank Conservation Act, along with
other New Deal legislation that eventually prohibited the American
people from owning gold, was imposedthroughout the nation. However, the
legislation itself was always applicable to the geographical United
States subject to Congress’ plenary power, not the Union of several
States. Each step of the way, it was up to state governments to
accommodate federal incursion that amounted to gross usurpation of
power.
A bit of history helps to understand the
scheme: Congress established two national banks in the first few
decades after convening government ofthe United States under the
Constitution. The charter of the first was revoked when international
bankers who owned it drove the fledgling nationinto debt that
threatened survival. In 1836, President Andrew Jackson vetoed the bill
that would have renewed the charter of the second national bank,
thereby putting an end to that one for the same reason the charter of
the first was terminated. President Jackson’s rationale was simple: The
Constitution does not authorize Congress to establish a national bank
or even corporations. Those powers, per the Tenth Amendment, are
reserved to the States, respectively.
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which
authorized the Federal Reserve System and privately owned Federal
Reserve regional banks, was primarily a territorial act. The Federal
Reserve banks serve as "fiscal agent" of the United States,
managing financial affairs of United States Government in its
intragovernmental capacity, and legitimately engages in lending
activity only in the geographical United States subject to Congress’
municipal authority.
Once this scheme was in place, the balance of
federal government had to follow. By the time the first edition of the
United States Code was produced in 1926, Congress had for all practical
purposes abandoned Article I § 8 delegated authority and had moved
virtually all legislation toterritorial authority. Officers of the
several States, whether intentionally or through ignorance, moved a
considerable distance with respect to accommodation prior to 1929, then
for all practical purposes capitulated with the advent of New Deal
legislation in 1933 and after.
The "Cooperative Federalism" side of the
Federalism scheme (Fabian Communism) was formalized by delegates of
state and local government via the Declaration of Interdependence
of the Governments within the United States of America in Common Council,
signed January 22, 1937at the third general assembly of the Council of
State Governments (Book of the States, Vol. 2, Book II, pp.
143-144).
As noted elsewhere, the U.S. Supreme Court
condemned original legislation that would have imposed a national
social welfare system (RailroadRetirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.,
295 U.S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 758 (1935)), so when the Social Security Act
was finally enacted, it was applicable only in territories and insular
possessions of the United States (See definitions of "State", "United
States", and "citizen" at 26 CFR § 31.3121(e)-1). Yet at the third
general assembly of the Council of State Governments, "Interstate
Cooperation Under the Social Security Act" was one of the major agenda
issues (pp. 133-134), along with other key elements of the New Deal
social welfare program.
The illusion here, however, is that most
accommodating legislation by state governments, as is the case for
"normal tax" and the like, is intragovernmental legislation. That is,
it applies to state officersand employees, not the general population.
This is exemplified by 51 Okla. Stat. § 125, which authorizes political
subdivisions of state government to contract for employee Social
Security coverage:
- Cite As: 51 O.S. § 125
(OSCN1999)
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Title 51. Officers
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Chapter 4
- §125. Plans for Coverage of
Employees of Political Subdivisions and of State and Local
Instrumentalities.
- (a) Each political subdivision
of the state and each instrumentality of the state or of a political
subdivision is hereby authorized to submit for approval by the state
agency a plan for extending the benefits of Title II of the Social
Security Act, in conformity with applicable federal law,to employees of
any such political subdivision or instrumentality. If not precluded by
applicable federal law and under such conditions as the state agency
may by regulation prescribe, two or more such political subdivisions or
instrumentalities may, for the purposes of this act, form a joint
coverage unit and as such submit for approval a joint plan if
otherwise, because of the requirements of the agreement entered into
pursuant to Section 123 or because of the requirements imposed by or
under applicable federal law, any subdivision or instrumentality
included in such unit would be unable to submit an approvable plan.
Each such plan or any amendment thereof shall be approved by the state
agency if it finds that such plan, or such plan as amended, is in
conformity with such requirements as are provided in regulations of the
state agency, except that no such plan shall be approved unless:
- (1) It is in conformity with
the requirements of the applicable federal law and with the agreement
entered into under Section 123;
- (2) It provides that all
services which constitute employment as defined in Section 122 and are
performed in the employ of the political subdivision or
instrumentality, or in the employ of any member of a joint coverage
unit submitting the plan, by any employees thereof, shall be covered by
the plan, provided that the plan may exclude from its coverage any
services which, under the provisions of that section, are excluded from
the term "employment" when so specified in a plan, except that it may
exclude services performed by individuals to whom Section 218(d)
- (3) (C) of the Social Security
Act is applicable;
- (3) It specifies the source or
sources from which the funds necessary to make the payments required by
paragraph (1) of subsection (c) and by subsection (d) are expected to
be derived and contains reasonable assurance that such sources will be
adequate for such purpose;
- (4) It provides for such
methods of administration of the plan by the political subdivision or
instrumentality or members of the joint coverage unit as are found by
the state agency to be necessary for the proper and efficient
administration of theplan;
- (5) It provides that the
political subdivision or instrumentality or members of the joint
coverage unit will make such reports, in such form and containing such
information, as the state agency may from time to time require, and
comply with such provisions as the state agency or the federal agency
may from time to time find necessary to assure the correctness and
verification of such reports; and
- (6) It authorizes the state
agency to terminate the plan in its entirety or, in the discretion of
the state agency, as to any member of a joint coverage unit, if it
finds that there has been a failure to comply substantially with any
provision contained in such plan, such termination to take effect at
the expiration of such notice and on such conditions as may be provided
by regulations of the state agency and be consistent with applicable
federal law.
- (b) The state agency shall not
finally refuse to approve a plan submitted under subsection (a), and
shall not terminate an approved plan, without reasonable notice and
opportunity for hearing to each political subdivision or
instrumentality affected thereby.
- (c) (1) Each political
subdivision or instrumentality as to which a plan has been approved
under this section shall pay into the Contribution Fund,with respect to
wages (as defined in Section 122 of this title), at such time or times
as the state agency may by regulation prescribe, contributions in the
amounts and at the rates specified in the applicable agreement entered
into by the state agency under Section 123.
- (2) Every political
subdivision or instrumentality required to make payments under
paragraph (1) of this subsection is authorized, in consideration of the
employee's retention in,or entry upon, employment after enactment of
this act, to impose upon its employees, as to services which are
covered by an approved plan, a contribution with respect to wages (as
defined in Section 122 of this title), not exceeding the amount of the
employeetax which would be imposed by the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act if such services constituted employment within the
meaning of that Act, and to deduct the amount of such contribution from
the wages as and when paid. Contributions so collected shall be paid
into the Contribution Fund in partial discharge of the liability of
such political subdivision or instrumentality under paragraph (1) of
this subsection. Failure to deduct such contribution shall not relieve
the employee or employer of liability therefor.
- (d) Delinquent payments due
under paragraph (1) of subsection (c) may,with interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum, be recovered by action in a court of
competent jurisdiction against the political subdivisionor
instrumentality liable therefor or may, at the request of the state
agency, be deducted from any other monies payable to such subdivision
or instrumentality by any department or agency of the state.
- Historical Data
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Added by Laws 1949, p. 377, §
5, emerg. eff. June 1, 1949. Amended by Laws
- 1955, p. 280, § 5, emerg. eff.
June 6, 1955.
The "public money" link via federally
chartered and/or regulated financial institutions is best demonstrated
by accounts insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, per
12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(2)(A):
- (2)(A) Notwithstanding any
limitation in this chapter or in any other provision of law relating to
the amount of deposit insurance available for the account of any one
depositor, in the case of a depositor who is &emdash;
-
- an officer, employee, or agent
of the United States having official custody of public funds and
lawfully investing or depositing the same in time and savings deposits
in an insured depository institution;
- (ii) an officer, employee, or
agent of any State of the United States, or of any county,
municipality, or political subdivision thereof havingofficial custody
of public funds and lawfully investing or depositing the same in time
and savings deposits in an insured depository institution in such
State;
- an officer, employee, or agent
of the District of Columbia having official custody of public funds and
lawfully investing or depositing the same in time and savings deposits
in an insured depositoryinstitution in the District of Columbia;
- an officer, employee, or agent
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, of the Virgin Islands, of American
Samoa, of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of Guam, or of
any county, municipality, or political subdivision thereof having
official custody of public funds and lawfully investing or depositing
the same in time and savings deposits in an insureddepository
institution in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or Guam,
respectively; or
- (v) an officer, employee, or
agent of any Indian tribe (as defined insection 1452(c) of title 25) or
agency thereof having official custody of tribal funds and lawfully
investing or depositing the same in time and savings deposits in an
insured depository institution; such depositor shall, for the purpose
of determining the amount of insured deposits under this subsection, be
deemed a depositor in such custodial capacity separateand distinct from
any other officer, employee, or agent of the United States or any
public unit referred to in clause (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v).
- and the deposit of any such
depositor shall be insured in an amount not to exceed $100,000 per
account in an amount not to exceed $100,000 peraccount. (FOOTNOTE 1)
-
- (FOOTNOTE 1) So in
original. The second occurrence of the phrase ''inan amount not to
exceed $100,000 per account'' probably should not appear.
-
- FDIC insures only deposits of "public
money," and as demonstrated by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(2)(A) and 31 CFR §
202.1, only officers and employees of United States Government and
political subdivisions of the United States are entitled to receive and
use public money. In fact, the controlling definition of "State" which
prescribes territorial jurisdiction of FDIC at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(3)
provides oneof the most inclusive lists of "States of the United
States":
-
- (3) State. - The term
''State'' means any State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, any territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam,
American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Virgin
Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
- Oklahoma and other States of the Union
accommodate the fraud via assorted adopted uniform acts such as
authorization for state agencies and instrumentalities to contract
Social Security benefits for employees of the state and its political
subdivision, but regardless of state legislation, the federal agency
has no right or lawful authority to enter such contracts unless
Congress has specifically authorized them. The definition of "State"
above clearly demonstrates the geographical limits Congress has
imposed, regardless of how willing state and local government officials
are to enter such contracts. So far asthe Union of States is concerned,
Congress cannot exercise a power not enumerated in the U.S.
Constitution, and the several States, either unilaterally or by
agreement, cannot accommodate an exercise of federal power not
enumerated in the Constitution, per New York v. United States,
supra. Where the federal social welfare system and "public money"; are
concerned, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander: Article
I § 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the several States from
emitting bills of credit, or making anything but gold and silver coina
tender for payment of debt.
-
- The geographical limitation on federal
departments, agencies, et al, is positive, not passive. Congress built
a legal fence around them via legislation now classified at 4 U.S.C. §§
71 & 72:
-
- Sec. 71. Permanent seat of
Government
-
- All that part of the
territory of the United States included within the present limits of
the District of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of
the United States. (July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 643)
-
- Sec. 72. Public offices; at
seat of Government
-
- All offices attached to the
seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and
not elsewhere, except as otherwise expresslyprovided by law. (July 30,
1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 643)
-
- The federal entity, whether the
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the Department
of Agriculture, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or federally
chartered enterprises such as national banks and federal savings and
loan associations, are subject to territorial as well as subject matter
limitation. As demonstrated by definitions of "State", "United
States", and "citizen" at 26 CFR § 31.3121(e)-1, the Social Security
Administration is geographically limited to territory of the United
States, including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, Guam, and American Samoa. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation has approximately the same geographical limits, and it has
"subject matter" jurisdiction limited to "public money." While the
State of Oklahoma participates in federal social welfare and public
money schemes, it does so under colorof law. The department or agency
officer who enters agreements with States of the Union and their
respective political subdivisions is "outlaw", operating beyond limits
of law. If the arrangement accommodatesa federal power not enumerated
in the U.S. Constitution, which is the case for federal social welfare
and public money schemes, the contractual arrangement and all
accommodating acts are void. Alexander Hamilton set this principle out
in Federalist Paper No. 78:
-
- There is no position which
depends on clearer principle than that every act of a delegated
authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is
exercised is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the
Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the
deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above the
master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the
people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only
what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.
-
- To further demonstrate fraud effected
via the banking system, it is useful to review the context of federal
law responsible for their creation and various functions: To begin,
national banks, federal savings and loans, federal credit unions, and
other such entities are chartered as associations. They are not
incorporated to operate with open-door policy the way retail merchants
do. The original charters authorize them to provide basic banking
services such as checking accounts for qualified association members.
Those qualified to be association members are officers and employees of
United States Government and political subdivisions of the
UnitedStates. They traffic exclusively in public money, which only
officers and employees of U.S. Government and its political
subdivisions are entitled to receive and use. (See 12 U.S.C. §
1821(a)(2)(A), supra, and 31 CFR § 202.1)
-
- In order to do anything besides cash
checks, provide checking accounts, and provide other basic services,
the financial institution must apply and be certified as a Treasury tax
and loan depositary (31 CFR §§; 202 & 203). Once qualified in this
capacity, they operate as fiscal agents of the United States. As fiscal
agents, they can provide a variety of services for United States
Government and its various political subdivisions. One function is to
serve as a medium for transmission of federal grants to qualified
recipients. Another is to provide tax trust accounts for government
agencies required to withhold and pay normal tax and other taxes in
Subtitles A, B & C of the Internal Revenue Code. They may also
serve in the capacity of withholding agent for governmental entities
required to pay normal tax and the various federal social welfare taxes.
- In order to engage in lending activity,
the financial institution mustapply and be certified as one of several
kinds of special banks. For example, any given national bank, qualified
"State" bank [SIC], savings and loan, etc., may function as a Federal
Home Loan Bank, Intermediate Credit Bank, Farm Credit Bank, etc.
However, whenever the financial institution operates in any of these
capacities, it leaves its associationcapacity behind, and functions as
an agency of United States Government.It is classified as a
mixed-ownership government corporation, per 31 U.S.C. § 9101:
-
- TITLE 31 - MONEY AND FINANCE
- SUBTITLE VI - MISCELLANEOUS
- CHAPTER 91 - GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS
- Sec. 9101. Definitions
-
- In this chapter &emdash;
- (1) ''Government
corporation'' means a mixed-ownership Government corporation and a
wholly owned Government corporation.
- (2) ''mixed-ownership
Government corporation'' means
-
- Amtrak.
- the Central Bank for Cooperatives.
- the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
- the Federal Home Loan Banks.
- the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks.
- the Federal Land Banks.
- the National Credit Union Administration
Central Liquidity Facility.</LI>
- the Regional Banks for Cooperatives.
- the Rural Telephone Bank when the
ownership, control, and operation of the Bank are converted under
section 410(a) of the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C.
950(a)).
- the United States Railway Association.
- the Financing Corporation.
- the Resolution Trust Corporation.
-
(M) the Resolution Funding
Corporation.
-
- (3) ''wholly owned Government
corporation'' means &emdash;
-
- the Commodity Credit Corporation.
-
(B) the Community Development
Financial Institutions Fund; (FOOTNOTE 1)
-
- (FOOTNOTE 1) So in original. The
semicolon probably should be a period.
- the Export-Import Bank of the United
States.
- the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation.
- Federal Prison Industries, Incorporated.
- the Corporation for National and
Community Service.
- the Government National Mortgage
Association.
- the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation.
- the Pennsylvania Avenue Development
Corporation.
- the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
- the Rural Telephone Bank until the
ownership, control, and operation of the Bank are converted under
section 410(a) of the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C.
950(a)).
- the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development
Corporation.
- the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development when carrying out duties and powers related to the Federal
Housing Administration Fund.
- the Tennessee Valley Authority. (N)
(FOOTNOTE 2) the Uranium Enrichment Corporation.
-
- (FOOTNOTE 2) So in original. Probably
should be ''(O)''.
-
- Virtually all lending by financial
institutions companies that issue credit cards, is made under auspices
of mixed-ownership or wholly-owned government corporations. As the
medium in transaction accounts is "public money", credit the
mixed-ownership government corporation issues is hypothecated on credit
of the United States. In one way or another, whether directly or
through wholly-owned government insurance corporations, United States
Government underwrites all financial institution credit transactions.
- This is made clearer when considering
the definition of the term "credit", which on the federal side appears
in Regulation Z (12 CFR § 226.2(14)):
-
- (14) Credit means
the right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its
payment.
-
- This definition is essentially the same
asthe definition of credit at 14A Okla. Stat. § 1-301(a)(7):
-
- (7) "Credit" means the right
granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur
debt and defer its payment.
-
- A question resolves what might appear to
be a dilemma: Does private enterprise have power to grant authority to
defer payment of debt, or to incur debt then defer payment? Hardly.
Only government has theoretical authority to grant such power, but
Article I § 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits States of the Union
from emitting bills of credit, which necessarily prohibits them from
authorizing private enterprise to emit bills of credit, and it
prohibits them from makinganything but gold and silver coin a tender
for payment of debt. Consequently, "credit" issued via mixed-ownership
government corporations, and underwritten by wholly-owned government
corporations, comes by way of United States Government, it is an
intragovernmental benefit extended only to officers and employees of
the United States and its political subdivisions (the geographical
United States). The United States is at alltimes principal of interest.
The financial institution merely provides agent or agency services.
Operating as a Federal Home Loan Bank, a FederalIntermediate Credit
Bank, or whatever, the financial institution initiates credit
transactions and services accounts, but the United States remains
principal of interest, and is responsible for collecting delinquent
accounts. The financial institution has no private or independent right
of action for collection of delinquent or defaulted accounts.
- Federal authority relative to "credit"
extends to virtually all contemporary financial institutions, including
credit card companies,as evidenced by the definition of "creditor" at
12 CFR § 226(a)(17):
-
- (17) Creditor means
(I) A person (A) who regularly extends consumer credit that is subject
to a finance charge or is payable by written agreement in more than 4
installments (not including a down payment), and (B) to whom the
obligation is initially payable, either on the face of the note or
contract, or by agreementwhen there is no note or contract.
-
- Congress further locked the matter down
at 31 U.S.C. § 9102 by stipulating that mixed-ownership government
corporations (lending banks of various sorts) can be established or
acquiredonly under law of the United States:
-
- TITLE 31 - MONEY AND FINANCE
- SUBTITLE VI - MISCELLANEOUS
- CHAPTER 91 - GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS
-
- Sec. 9102. Establishing and
acquiring corporations
-
- An agency may establish or
acquire a corporation to act as an agency only by or under a law of the
United States specifically authorizing the action.
-
- -SOURCE-
- (Pub. L. 97-258, Sept. 13,
1982, 96 Stat. 1042.)
-
- The lending institution, operating in a
federal agency capacity, exists by virtue of, and must comply with all
federal statutory and regulatorymandates and prohibitions. Therefore,
it is not subject to state law in its lending capacity. In its original
capacity, it may provide basic financial services for qualified
association members only; as a Treasury tax and loan depositary, it
functions as fiscal agent of the United States for purposes specified
by law; and when it qualifies as a lending institution, if functions as
a mixed-ownership government corporation in an agencycapacity. It may
originate and service credit transactions. The credit transactions are
hypothecated on credit of the United States, and the United States is
at all times principal of interest.
- In the event of delinquency or default,
the "employer" of the "employee" (See definitions of "employee" at 26
U.S.C. § 3401(c ), and "employer" at § 3401(d)) is responsible for
presenting the claim and negotiating a payment agreement (See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 5510-5520a generally; see § 5513 relating tocompromise and
installment payment agreements). In the event the employee fails or
refuses to pay, the General Accounting Office, which is general agent
of the Treasury of the United States (Act of June 10, 1921, ch. 18,
title III, 42 Stat. 23), is required to determine liability, then
turnthe matter over to the Attorney General, in his capacity as
Solicitor ofthe Treasury, for litigation (5 U.S.C. § 5512):
-
- Sec. 5512. Withholding pay;
individuals in arrears
-
- (a)The pay of an individual
in arrears to the United States shall be withheld until he has
accounted for and paid into the Treasury of the United States all sums
for which he is liable.
-
- (b) When pay is withheld
under subsection (a) of this section, the General Accounting Office, on
request of the individual, his agent, or his attorney, shall report
immediately to the Attorney General the balance due; and the Attorney
General, within 60 days, shall order suit to be commenced against the
individual.
-
-
- Per 28 U.S.C. § 1345, litigation for
collection of debt must be commenced in a district court of the United
States:
-
- Sec. 1345. United States as
plaintiff
-
- Except as otherwise provided
by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by
the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly
authorized to sue by Act of Congress.
-
-
- By virtue of the "arising under" clause
at Article III §; 2 ¶ 1 of the U.S. Constitution, courts of the United
States have jurisdiction exclusive of courts of the several States:
-
- Section 2. The judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority…
-
- Litigation must proceed in accordance
withfederal debt collection procedure prescribed in Chapter 176 of
Title 28 of the United States Code, §§ 3001 et seq.
- It has been customary for Oklahoma
courts and courts of other States of the Union to accommodate financial
institution foreclosures and the like, but all such judgments are void
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the following reasons: (1)
As a State of the Union, Oklahoma cannotemit bills of credit, which
necessarily precludes endorsing and enforcing private bills of credit;
(2) Oklahoma and other States of the Union cannot make anything but
gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt; (3) courts of the
United States have original and exclusive jurisdiction under authority
of the "arising under" clause at Article III § 2 ¶ 1 of the U.S.
Constitution, and by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1345; and (4) the financial
institutions are operating under color of authority and contrary to
laws of the United States.
- Here again, Congress implemented a
couple of safety valves: The Privacy Act and the Paperwork Reduction
Act impose disclosure requirements on all information-gathering forms.
The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) requires all information-gathering
forms to inform whomever is asked to complete the form, including
credit applications and the like, if information requested on the form
is voluntary, mandatory, or necessary to secure or retain a benefit.
- Regulations for the Paperwork Reduction
Act provide what amounts to a silver bullet (5 CFR § 1320.6):
-
- § 1320.6 Public protection.
-
- a. Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for
failing to comply with a collection of information that is subject to
the requirements of this part if:
-
- 1. The collection of
information does not display, in accordance with §1320.3(f) and §
1320.5(b)(1), a currently valid OMB control number assigned by the
Director in accordance with the Act; or
-
- 2. The agency fails to
inform the potential person who is to respond to the collection of
information, in accordance with § 1320.5(b)(2), that such person is not
required to respond to the collection of information unless it displays
a currently valid OMB control number.
-
- a. The protection
provided by paragraph (a) of this section may be raised in the form of
a complete defense, bar, or otherwise to the imposition of such penalty
at any time during the agency administrative process in which such
penalty may be imposed or in any judicial action applicable thereto.
-
- Privacy Act and Paperwork Reduction Act
notice requirements prescribe necessary elements to be displayed on all
information-gathering forms. This is as much a requirement on financial
institutions operating as agentsof United States Government as
particulars prescribed for currency, postage stamps, money orders or
any other security or negotiable instrument issued under auspices of
U.S. government authority. Where the institution fails to comply with
statutory and regulatory requirements, it utters bogus and counterfeit
securities under color of authority of the United States. In sum, it
engages in criminal enterprise. This is the reason 5 CFR §
1320.6(b) provides a complete defense against administrative or
judicial remedies that can be raised at any time, including after the
fact. The credit transaction predicated on an application which fails
to complywith Privacy Act and Paperwork Reduction Act regulations has
the character of counterfeit money and securities. If and when a
counterfeit dollar or security is discovered, the person responsible
for issuing it has civil and criminal liability. Further, he has no
lawful remedy for collectionor execution.
- This matter is relevant as credit
applications from all manner of financial institutions have been
examined, and to date, none have complied with Privacy Act and
Paperwork Reduction Act disclosure mandates.
- The Uniform Commercial Code, the
Oklahoma Consumer Credit Code, and other such adopted acts, suppose to
accommodate suppose to accommodate monetary units other than gold and
silver coin, and generally speaking, accommodate enforcement of private
bills of credit, both of which are prohibited by Article I § 10 ¶ 1 of
the U.S. Constitution. Beyond that,federally chartered and/or regulated
financial institutions exist and conduct business by virtue of and
within a preexisting body of federal law which necessitates compliance
with federal statutory and regulatory mandates and prohibitions.
Governments of the several States, Oklahoma included, have absolutely
no authority to enlarge or alter functions of these institutions in
their respective capacities as mixed-ownership government corporations
and agents of United States Government.
- At Article XXIII §§ 8 & 9, the
Oklahoma Constitution voids all contracts, and notice and demand
instruments, which seek to abridge, avoid or otherwise compromise
constitutional mandates and prohibitions:
-
- § 8. Contracts waiving
benefits of Constitution invalid
-
- Any provision of a contract,
express or implied, made by any person, by which any of the benefits of
this Constitution is sought to be waived, shall be null and void.
-
- § 9. Notice or demand,
stipulation for
-
- Any provision of any
contract or agreement, express or implied, stipulating for notice or
demand other than such as may be provided by law, as a condition
precedent to establish any claim, demand, or liability, shallbe null
and void.
Aside from
constrains of federal law, prohibitions of Article I §10 of the U.S.
Constitution are preserved by Article XXIII §§ 8 & 9 of the
Oklahoma Constitution, above. Private bills of credit, whether in the
form of the private scrip Federal Reserve Note or some other token
currency, the "public money" scam common to bank transaction accounts,
or contracts that create obligations to be discharged by "deferred
payment" through ledger-entry debits that have absolutely no substance
and do not constitute consideration of value, are uniformly condemned.
Notice and demand predicated on these frauds is likewise condemned,
both declared void the law of the land in Oklahoma.
- Judgments of Oklahoma courts that have
accommodated financial institutions operating under color of authority
of the United States are void forlack of subject matter jurisdiction by
virtue of Article I § 10 andArticle III § 2 of the U.S. Constitution,
and Article I § 1 ofthe Oklahoma Constitution. Under Oklahoma conflict
of law doctrine (75 Okla. Stat. § 12), original acts, including
constitutions of Oklahomaand the United States, in all cases prevail.
- The more I looked at Jim Prentice's question concerning
"credit", and my response, the more I was convinced the piece would
make a good 4-page handout to give people who aren't familiar with
"patriot" issues. Consequently, I spent time I didn't have editing and
adding to the piece. It is attached in HTML.
-
- In Word for Mac, 12 pt. Times, with 6 point spacing between
paragraphs, it fits comfortably on four pages. For 20 cents or less for
each copy, you can have something to blanket the neighborhood with. You
might want to take a few to your favorite bank to see if the chief
executive officer would like to distribute them. Or see if your
Congressman, or even your local judge, would like to share what skunks
they are.
-
- Dan Meador
-
-
How the
Credit System is Destroying America
-
-
By Dan Meador
-
-
-
Introduction
-
- Jim Prentice of Miami, Florida responded to a memorandum on
banking, credit and money that I transmitted over Internet with a
request for clarification. His request relates to the definition of
"credit" found in the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act and
corresponding state consumer acts. In approximate terms, both define
"credit" as the grant of authority to defer payment of debt, or to
incur debt then defer its payment.
-
- This is what the banking system does: When a bank extends
credit, it authorizes people not to pay debt. Instead of paying debt,
the obligation is deferred by giving bank credit to whoever provides
goods and services. Credit changes hands, not money.
-
- While increasing numbers are beginning to understand how this
scheme is destroying the nation, too many don't grasp how the system
works or why it is destroying America. One of the problems is the
technical language used to explain the system. Another is that nobody
has stated the case in a short composition most any literate person can
easily understand. My response to Jim was reasonably lucid, so it is
being reproduced for general distribution.
-
- Jim's query follows this introduction, then my explanation
follows his query. The response has been slightly expanded.
-
- Jim Prentice Query
-
- Hi Dan.
-
- I have had a somewhat difficult time explaining what is meant
by the phrase "incur debt and defer its payment". I believe I
understand it to mean that payment is made with debt which is passed
along from one to another which appears to be payment but is in reality
the passing of "IOU'S". A 'check' is a promise to pay, Federal Reserve
Notes are for all practical purposes IOU'S and are not in fact payment.
Unless "Payment" is tendered in legal money, gold or silver, payment is
not made and that which has been purchased has not lawfully been paid
for. Therefore, ownership is not free and clear, or allodial.
-
- Please correct my understanding if I am wrong or off point.
Possibly you can write a much clearer definition or explanation.
-
- Thanks for your time and god bless.
-
- Dan Meador Response
-
- To understand the "defer payment" nonsense, suppose I am in the
banking business. You open an account with me. You come in one day
needing cash, and my cashier tells you, "We haven't printed our money
yet, but we're specially marking bills out of a Monopoly game. I'll
give you some of that stuff. You tell merchants you spend it with that
we will give them credit when they bring it back to us."
-
- Obviously, nothing is paid. The medium of exchange is scrip, or
put another way, token money. It has no intrinsic or inherent value.
Whoever agrees to accept it for goods and services agrees to take my
"credit" in lieu of payment.
-
- Next month you tell me you want to buy a house. You need to
borrow a hundred thousand dollars. That's fine, I tell you, so I get
you to sign a mortgage, using the house as security, then write out a
check to you or whoever you make the purchase from. Probably I "credit"
your account with whatever you want to borrow. To me, and you, the
"credit" is simply a ledger entry effected by writing the sum in the
debit column of my accounts book, and a corresponding figure in the
credit column of your account. You then write the check to the seller,
thereby putting my "credit" into circulation.
-
- What is the check? It is a "bill of credit." There is nothing
of substance behind it other than the house. In other words, if the
scheme works, you and the seller have invited me to "monetize" the
house. The seller must then peddle my credit in order to make other
purchases. The only thing of value other than the house is your sweat
equity, the returns you receive from whatever service or product you
provide in order to earn a living.
-
- In order to implement this scheme, I bribe government officials
to take all real money out of circulation so everyone is dependent on
my Monopoly money and credit. Nobody ever really pays a debt because
there is nothing to pay it with. I impose healthy charges for issuing
credit (loan origination fees, account service fees, and interest), and
the Monopoly money I circulate is purchased from profits from the
credit scheme. The Monopoly money costs next to nothing because it has
no stand-alone value. When the scheme finally collapses, you can use it
to light your cigars.
-
- There are two adverse general effects. First, we're dealing
with arbitrary monetary value, so as I infuse the system with credit,
denominated in Monopoly money amounts, the current price of goods and
services constantly inflates, thereby devaluing the purchasing power of
existing checking accounts, passbook savings accounts, retirement life
insurance polices, and labor. In other words, the purchasing power of
your sweat equity and your productive enterprise is debased.
-
- This is a musical chairs game played out in real life. The
reason is this: I don't lend credit necessary to pay interest.
Therefore, the system never has enough money for everyone to make
essential purchases such as food, shelter and clothing, pay debt
principal, and make interest payments. Those on the short end of the
rope are forced into default by foreclosure, abandonment or bankruptcy
liquidation. The farmer, small business owner, independent craftsman,
independent merchant, and labor are all ravaged by the scheme. This has
an unavoidable consolidation effect. As those on the short end of the
rope are liquidated, the scavenger scoops up everything of value at
bargain basement prices. This pressure is behind consolidation of major
corporations over the last two decades. The big fish eat the little
ones until there are no little ones left, then they eat each other. In
the meantime, American production and working classes are being driven
down the economic ladder to third world status.
-
- In order to stave off domestic rebellion, the banking community
cuts deals with elected and appointed public servants. First, we're
going to give the system elasticity by making increasingly large loans
in order to expand monetary supply, thereby slowing down the
liquidation process. We have to do this to accommodate unavoidable
inflation. Second, we will get our government shills to implement a
social welfare program that provides a subsistence floor for those
victimized by our fraudulent credit and monetary schemes. Government,
of course, will tax the people to pay for the social welfare program.
The greatest tax burden will be levied on middle income classes. Key
players will be relatively unaffected by the tax scheme. We'll sell
this plan based on the notion that "preservation of capital" is
essential. Private borrowing will be supplemented by government
borrowing, so government, which serves as the ultimate social welfare
program, must continuously expand to compensate for the broadside of
private enterprise.
-
- Home mortgages presently monazite approximately 70% of the
nation's monetary system. Precious few Americans have outright
ownership of homes. Government borrowing has escalated sufficiently
that interest on cumulative federal debt exceeds a quarter of a
trillion dollars per year. If government legitimately balanced the
budget, the American economy would collapse. The system is as dependent
on constant infusion of hypothecated government credit as a heroine
addict is to the opium poppy.
-
- The credit-based system is somewhat like the wheel the hamster
has in his cage. In this case, however, once someone gets started on
it, he can't get off. Since a vast majority of the American people are
in invisible credit cages, everyone is running the banker's wheel.
-
- We see the same kind of hocus-pocus in judgments against
tobacco companies. Were they required to outright pay milti-billion
dollar judgments? No, they are simply increasing the price of tobacco
products so consumers pay the judgments out over time. Whether via
increased government "sin" taxes or judgments against private
corporations, the consumer is being taxed. The first is a legislative
excise tax; the second is a judicial excise tax. The conglomerate,
multinational tobacco company continues business as usual. It hasn't
been forced to empty its coffers or liquidate anything.
-
- Banks constantly pass on "inflation" tax that undermines
sovereignty and solvency of the nation. The effect of interest on real
wealth is like the supernova black hole. Nothing caught in its
gravitational sphere of influence can escape.
-
- The scheme is condemned by Article I, Section 10 of the U.S.
Constitution. States of the Union cannot emit bills of credit or make
anything but gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt. Since
they are prohibited from emitting bills of credit, it is obvious that
they do not have authority to endorse and enforce private bills of
credit.
-
- Prior to convening the Constitutional Convention, American
founders were confronted with the same thing we're dealing with today.
Many of the newly independent American states were issuing bills of
credit that they couldn't and wouldn't redeem. Speculators made out
like bandits while common classes were reduced to pauper status. Trade
was disrupted, and base industries destabilized. This is the reason
Article I, Sec. 10 of the Constitution sets out specific prohibitions
concerning credit and money. None of the prohibitions have been amended
or repealed. They remain in full force.
-
- Accommodation of the mathematically impossible credit and money
schemes is accomplished by what is described as color of law. It is
appearance of law only.
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- Memorandums by Dan Meador and other researchers can be
downloaded from Internet on the Law Research & Registry web site: www.LawResearch-Registry.org